I follow several physicians from Canada on Twitter. Since I do not have first hand experience of that health care system, I find their accounts instructive.
Some tweets are sadly biting:
Shawn Whatley, a Canadian physician I also follow, wrote in a recent blog post entitled “Medicine resists change” that:
Canadians took a bold, progressive move in the 1960s and created Medicare. And we’ve blocked change ever since.
Sure, we dribble in new technology. Embarrassment demands we buy at least a few PET scanners and robotic surgical assists. But our core system is unchanged.
Government and Organized Medicine insist that basic clinical services work the same as in the 1960s. Patients see their family doctor. Doctors send patients for ‘high-tech’ X-Rays, ultrasounds or blood tests. Patients drive to licensed and controlled lab facilities. Then they trudge back for results days later.
That sounds grim.
UPDATE: This article was cross-posted
on the Ludwig von Mises Institute website. It also prompted a rebuttal
at the Progressive Physician website, to which I made a brief reply
in a more recent post contrasting the Canadian and American health care systems.
In contrast to the expected shortage of tens of thousands of physicians, there appears to be an abundance of health care administrators, at least judging by the following graph:
The originators of the graph—economists and physician-activists at Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP)—invoke the administrative bloat as reason to promote a single payer system. With a single payer, they argue, complexity will be greatly reduced, the administrative burden wiped out, and costs brought under control.
For those who contend that administrative positions consist chiefly of make-work jobs soaking up a glut of workers otherwise destined to swell the ranks of the unemployed, this outcome could indeed be welcome. Unfortunately, if PNHP gets its wish, we may all discover that gluts and shortages are enhanced, not avoided, by the central planning process that would necessarily accompany the establishment of this program.
I keep getting served a Facebook ad from the American Association of Medical Colleges imploring me to ask politicians to fund residency training for medical school graduates. The link leads to a webpage with neat graphics and a series of well-designed cartoons dramatizing an ominous shortage of 90,000 doctors expected to occur by 2025.
Now, the notion of “doctor shortage” by itself is meaningless. Doctors—like plumbers—are a scarce resource and therefore always in shortage. Patients have always had to contend with waiting rooms, whether at the outpatient clinic or in the emergency department. People have always had to wait to see a specialist, especially a good one, and this will never change. The supply of doctors must be judged in the context of the needs of patients and the economics of supply and demand.
But here’s the rub.
On May 18, the website of the Ludwig von Mises Institute ran a slightly edited version of this article. You can find it here
In its current usage, the phrase “dismal science” is a disparagement leveled against mainstream economics for its failure to provide a coherent account of economic activity.
According to Austrian school critics of the neo-Keynesian synthesis, this failure is in large part due to a foolish determination to bring into economics the mathematical precision of the physical sciences. To achieve this precision, neo-classical economists disproportionately focus their inquiry on global measures of economic activity: gross national product, aggregate demand, global supplies of money, goods, or labor, and other variables that lend themselves to quantification and numerical modeling. Lost in mainstream economic analysis is the attention due to the individual economic actor who, by virtue of his or her power of self-determination, is ill-suited for the equation or the graph.
A similar love affair with quantitative methods has rapidly taken over the medical field over the last several decades.
Shortly after its initial posting on this site, this article was also cross-posted
on the website the Ludwig von Mises Institute under the title “The Mayo Clinic and the Free Market.” I have made some very minor edits since then. MA. April 18, 2015.
Neoclassical economists such as Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Stiglitz tell us that the health care market is imperfect (or “Pareto inefficient”), meaning that the allocation of services is not optimal from the standpoint of social welfare. They point to information asymmetry as an important cause of this imperfection: patients cannot distinguish on their own the physician from the charlatan, the surgeon from the butcher, the remedy from the snake oil, the hospital from the coop. This may lead to moral hazard where the party with the most knowledge can provide inferior service with impunity.
To provide the necessary counterbalance for this “knowledge gap,” experts must be in charge of social institutions that tell patients where to go, who to see, how to be treated, and how much it should cost. This has been a principal and virtually unchallenged argument underpinning health care legislation in the last 100 years. In a famous paper he wrote on the subject in 1963, Arrow declared that “It is the general social consensus, clearly, that the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable.”
But for those who wonder how intolerable the “laissez-faire solution” really is, a short booklet published in 1926 may prove instructive.
Emperor Joseph II: My dear young man, don’t take it too hard. Your work is ingenious. It’s quality work. And there are simply too many notes, that’s all. Just cut a few and it will be perfect.
Mozart: Which few did you have in mind, Majesty? (Amadeus, 1984)
The New York Times recently published an opinion editorial entitled “Squandering Medicare’s Money” in which Dr. Rita Redberg, professor of cardiology at UCSF, proposes that much of Medicare’s financial deficit could be reduced if the government did not spend “a fortune each year on procedures that have no proven benefit.” To support her contention, Redberg cites several studies which indicate that many routinely performed tests and treatments do not improve patient outcomes in any measurable way, and are therefore “unnecessary.” Examples given are screening colonoscopies for patients over 75, PAP smears for women over 65, coronary stents for people with stable angina, and so forth. At an estimated cost of $150 billion, these procedures seem like obvious candidates for the deficit-reduction chopping block.
In 1961 the Framingham study investigators introduced the term ‘risk factor’ to the medical community and ushered in the era of risk modification, now a dominant strategy for the prevention of diseases. Academic careers have succeeded and private enterprises have flourished on the promotion of this paradigm.
Currently, risk-factor reversal is an established surrogate for quality of care and a cornerstone of most pay-for-performance schemes allegedly designed to improve health outcomes. One particular risk factor, however, stands out by virtue of the unusual treatment it receives from public health advocates.